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Moral hazard is easy to justify theoretically but diﬃcult to de-
tect empirically. Individuals may report sick due to illness as well
as for moral hazard reasons. Potential abuse of the sickness in-
surance system in Sweden is estimated by comparing the change
between the number of men and women who report sick during a
popular sporting event and a preceding time period. Diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence estimates provide clear evidence that the number of
m e nw h or e p o r t e ds i c ki n c r e a s e di no r d e rt ow a t c ht h es p o r t i n g
event on television.
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Moral hazard is a well-known problem in economic theory but diﬃcult
to prove empirically. The main obstacle is to ﬁnd an exogenous source of
variation in the measure which represents individual behavior when seek-
ing to explain the outcome. In the case of changes in absence from work
due to illness, it is diﬃcult to separate a change in health eﬀects from
changes in other variables. Health varies cyclically and is correlated with
e.g. industry aﬃliation, work environment, labor-market conditions, type
of employment contract and labor income. Changes in these variables can
also explain absence due to illness.1
Abuse of the sickness insurance system could be an important ex-
planatory factor underlying changes in reporting sick. The objective of
this paper is to estimate potential existence of such abuse. To my knowl-
edge, no previous study has estimated this behavior in a causal manner.
Absence due to illness is pro-cyclical. In the case of Sweden, 25 sick days
were reported per capita when the economy peaked in 1988. As of 2001,
sick days per capita have returned to about the same high levels as in
1988. The procedure for reporting sick is simple; it only requires a phone
call to one’s workplace–a doctor’s certiﬁcate is not necessary until the
seventh day.
In the study reported here, I use the incidence of popular sporting
events broadcasted on television during regular working hours or at night
as quasi-experiments. The hypothesis that men report sick in order to
watch sports during working hours is tested by comparing the change
in the number of men and women who report sick between the sporting
event and a preceding time period. Women are used as the comparison
group because empirical evidence suggests that men watch sports on
1Barmby et al. (1991, 1995), Brown et al. (1999), Winkelmann (1999) and Arai
& Skogman Thoursie (2001) have found that the terms of employment contracts
are important in explaining absence. For a more extensive discussion of variables
explaining absence due to sickness, see e.g. Brown & Sessions (1996), Johansson &
Palme (1996) and Lidwall & Skogman Thoursie (2000).
1television more than women do (see Abrahamsson (1990)). This makes
it possible to control for all gender-speciﬁc factors such as occupational
status, health status, work environment and labor-market conditions,
as well as all symmetric seasonal factors such as a potential inﬂuenza
epidemic.
Traditional economic theory suggests that workers interested in watch-
ing sports on television have strong incentives to report sick if the value
of watching a sporting event is higher than the cost of doing so. Most
workers have a full-time contract implying a 40-hours work-week of ap-
proximately 8 hours a day, without the opportunity to freely allocate
the working hours over a day or a week. Thus, the optimal amount
of working hours might be lower than the contracted number of working
hours, particularly during weeks when a sporting event is broadcasted on
television during regular working hours. There are alternatives to report-
ing sick such as taking a day oﬀ or compensatory leave. Most workers,
however, have a ﬁxed number of yearly vacation days and taking one
or several days oﬀ would reduce future available vacation time by the
corresponding amount of days. Of course, the incentive to report sick in
order to watch sports would decrease with the risk of being detected and
the punishment associated with this risk.
The analysis is based on two popular sporting events that were broad-
casted on television during regular working time or on radio during
nights. The ﬁrst event was a World Championship cross-country ski-
ing competition (30 kilometers) in Oberstdorf, Germany, on February
12, 1987 and the second was the winter Olympic Games in Calgary,
Canada, February 13-28, 1988. Broadcast times for both events were
collected from old TV-magazines. This information was then combined
with register data on the population of illness cases started in 1987 and
1988. The results show an increase in the number of days men reported
sick during both events. A conservative calculation suggests male sick
days due to the Calgary Games constituted 3.6 percent of all sick days
2reported during the time period when the Games took place.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The criteria for
treating popular sporting events as quasi-experiments are described in
Section 2. The data are outlined in Section 3. The estimation results are
reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Popular events as quasi-experiments
Several criteria have to be fulﬁlled when the incidence of an event is used
as a quasi-experiment. First, the event has to aﬀect the treatment group
but not the comparison group. Second, the outcome of interest should
generally develop similarly over time for the treatment and the compari-
son groups. This reduces the risk that unobserved group-speciﬁc factors
of importance in explaining the outcome have developed diﬀerently for
the treatment and the comparison groups. Otherwise, this will seriously
bias the estimated impact of the event on the outcome. Third, the event
under study should aﬀect a clearly deﬁned underlying population thereby
making it easier to interpret the results.
Both of the sporting events mentioned in the Introduction fulﬁlt h e s e
criteria. The World Championship skiing competition was directly broad-
casted 10.55 a.m., i.e. during regular working hours. The winter Olympic
Games were broadcasted live on the radio at nights.
Men, i.e. the treatment group, watch sports more than women do,
and are therefore aﬀected by the event, whereas women, who consti-
tute the comparison group, are not. Both sporting events can be said
to aﬀect a substantial fraction of men in the sense that winter sports
are extremely popular in Sweden. Many world-famous Swedish cross-
country skiers such as Gunde Svan and Thomas Wassberg, participated
in Oberstdorf. These cross-country skiers, the ice-skater Thomas Gus-
tavsson, the Swedish ice-hockey team–to mention a few–participated
in the Calgary Games. All of these teams and athletes were anticipated
3to be highly successful in both events. For these reasons, criteria one is
most likely to be met.
The second criteria is also likely to be met because absence due to
illness shows a similar development for men and women in general. Fur-
thermore, both events took place during periods without dramatic sea-
sonal variations in the outcome measure or erratic absence due to illness.
This reduces the risk of capturing spurious changes in outcome for ei-
ther of the groups. For example, it seemed important to avoid sporting
events that took place during holidays, where absence due to illness show
dramatic jumps. One explanation for this is that men and women are al-
located diﬀerently across sectors. In some sectors, such as the care sector
where women are overrepresented, workers are often required to work on
holidays, implying that women are under a greater risk of reporting sick.
The third criteria is met since both sporting events took place during
periods where sick leave is at relatively high levels. For example, using
sporting events in the summer, when very few workers report sick, is
problematic because the results would be based on a potentially selected
sample. For this reason, an eﬀect potentially obtained from the events
chosen in this study can be interpreted in terms of a general behavioral
eﬀect.
The quasi-experimental design used here has some advantages com-
pared to many other studies with an analogous design but applied to
other issues. A common feature in earlier studies is that changes in out-
come measures are compared over years or months.2 For this reason,
there is always a risk that characteristics of the treatment and the com-
parison groups have developed diﬀerently over these periods. If these
characteristics are crucial in explaining the outcome and the researcher
2Many studies have compared diﬀerences in post and pre-program yearly earn-
ings between participants in labor-market programs and non-participants (see e.g.
Ashenfelter (1978), Ashenfelter & Card (1985)). For other studies with an analogous
approach where changes in yearly outcome variables are used, see e.g. Card (1990),
Card & Krueger (1994), Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995), Gruber (1996), Goldin &
Rouse (2000) and Angrist & Lavy (2001).
4has no information on them, the results can be seriously biased. In this
paper, changes in absence due to illness between two adjacent time pe-
riods are analyzed. Therefore, it is most unlikely that the unobserved
characteristics of men and women developed diﬀerently during the spec-
iﬁed periods.
3 Data and empirical strategy
The data used are from the Register of Cases Due to Illness collected
by the Swedish National Social Insurance Board. The Register includes
information on the start and end dates of all cases of illness as well as on
sex and age. The skiing competition took place on a particular Thursday
in 1987 and the winter Olympic Games took place during a two-week
period in 1988. I therefore restricted the sample to the population of
one-day and two-day cases of illness which started in 1987 and one-day to
seven-day cases which started in 1988. The sample was further restricted
to ages 20-64.3 Sample statistics for cases of illness which began in 1987
and 1988, respectively, are summarized in Table A1 in the Appendix.
When analyzing the eﬀect of the sporting events on the number of
men who reported sick, the sick rate is used as the outcome variable. The
sick rate is deﬁned as the share–in percent–of the number of cases of a
speciﬁcl e n g t hi nr e l a t i o nt ot h et o t a lo fe m p l o y m e n ti nh u n d r e d s . 4 For
example, the male sick rate for one-day cases on the Oberstdorf Thurs-
day is 6.5 5 . T h i si m p l i e st h a t1 ,395 (0.00655 × 2,130,500) employed
m e nr e p o r t e do n es i c kd a yo nt h eO b e r s t d o r fT h u r s d a y . T h a ti s ,at o -
tal 2,130,500 men were employed in February 1987. Employment in
3In Sweden it is possible to receive partial sickness beneﬁts. The sample here is
restricted to the population with full-time sickness beneﬁts.
4I use the number of cases of illness in relation to employment in order to have
a measure describing the risk of becoming sick. An unemployed person can report
sick but the unemployment rates for men and women were at very low levels (about
2 percent) during 1987 and 1988. For unemployment ﬁgures, see Statistics Sweden
(1987,1988).
5hundreds is used simply to avoid even more decimals.
One-day and two-day cases of illness which started on the speciﬁc
Thursday were used to analyze the skiing competition in Oberstdorf.
Regarding the Calgary Games, one-day to seven-day cases which started
on any day except Saturday and Sunday within a two-week period were
used.
The development of the ratio between the male and female Thursday
sick rates from the middle of January to the beginning of April in 1987 is
reported in Figure 1 (the vertical line at 7 corresponds to the Oberstdorf
Thursday).5 The ratio between male and female sick rates is rather
constant over time. The exception is the Oberstdorf Thursday for one-
day cases where the ratio seems to jump upwards. This implies that
relative to women, there was an increase in the number of men who
reported sick on this Thursday.
The development of the ratio between the male and female sick rates
the ﬁrst quarter of 1988 is reported in Figures 2a and 2b (the vertical
line at 3 corresponds to the Calgary two-week period).6 For all lengths,
the ratios are almost constant over time except for a jump during the
the period of the Calgary Games. Again, relative to women, the number
of men who reported sick seems to have increased during the Calgary
Games.
To summarize, male and female sick rates developed similarly over
time except during the two sporting events. In order to examine the
apparent increase in the number of men who reported sick during the
two events in more detail, I now turn to the statistical method applied
in this study.
5The value 3 on the x-axis represents Thursday, January 15th, the value 4 Thurs-
day, January 22nd and so on.
6The ﬁrst two-week period is the second half of January, the second two-week
period is the ﬁr s th a l fo fF e b r u a r y ,e t c .
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7The simple model used here is based on the assumption that any
diﬀerences in sick rates between men and women are ﬁxed over time.
Letting Y s
it be a variable indicating whether any employed individual i
belonging to sex s (s = M if male and F if female) at time t is reported
sick, the regression model may be written as:
Y
s
it = α + βd





where ds is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the worker is a male (0
if female), dt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if there is a popular
sporting event at time t (0 otherwise) and ds
t is a dummy variable taking
the value 1 if there is a popular sporting event at time t and if the worker
is a male (0 otherwise).7 εs
it is the disturbance term.
The casual eﬀect of the sporting event on the behavior of men who
report sick, assumed to be constant, is represented by δ. The key identi-
fying assumption is that δ would be zero in the absence of the event, or
E[εs
it|ds
t] = 0. This is likely to be the case since sick rates between two
adjacent time periods are compared and any changes in gender-speciﬁc
characteristics that are relevant in explaining absence due to illness are
not likely to change over a very short time period such as from one
week to another. The speciﬁcation in equation (1) controls for all ﬁxed
gender diﬀerences, ds, and all period-speciﬁce ﬀects common to all in-
dividuals, dt. Thus, while men may have lower sick rates than women,
these diﬀerences are assumed to be due to diﬀerences in occupational
status, work environment, etc. that can be regarded as permanent and
have time-invariant eﬀects on behavior related to reporting sick. Fur-
thermore, potential time shocks such as the incidence of an inﬂuenza
epidemic are captured by dt as long as they have a symmetric eﬀect on
men and women.
7Thus, ds
t is simply an interaction variable between the male dummy variable and
time dummy variable representing the time when the sporting event took place.
8The casual eﬀect of a popular sporting event is identiﬁed by com-
paring the change in male sick rates between the period of the event
and the preceding period with the corresponding change in female rates.
Denoting t = p as the time period of the popular sporting event period
(”period of sporting event”) and t = b as the period before the event
(”before sporting event”), the expected change in male sick rates be-












s =0 ]=δ. (2)
An unbiased estimate–the ”diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence” estimator (dd)–
of the event, δ, is obtained by taking the sample analog of equation (2):











where a bar indicates an average over individuals i.8
The method applied here does not estimate the relative change in
reporting sick. The absolute change in reporting sick is estimated instead,
which may be somewhat misleading. For example, if the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence estimate of the speciﬁc sporting event turns out to be zero, it
might be the case that as compared to women, the number of men who
reported sick increased more in relative terms because male sick rates
are always at lower levels. Thus, the estimation technique applied here
is a conservative test of potential abuse of the sickness insurance system
among men.
Two additional hypotheses are tested. First, a worker who reports
sick in order to watch the skiing competition at Oberstdorf might call in
sick on Wednesday to convince his employer that he is really sick. There-
8As an alternative, δ could be estimated using the probit model. Since each male
or female in a speciﬁc time period is just a replicate of the other individuals belonging
to this group, the contribution of each individual to the likelihood function is identical
and a grouped probit model can be estimated.
9fore, I also consider two-day cases of illness which started on Wednesday
in the analysis.
Second, potential abuse of the sickness insurance system might dif-
fer among age groups. Older workers usually have a higher degree of
employment protection than younger workers. For example, in Sweden
the share of temporary employment contracts is greater among younger
workers and it is much easier for an employer not to renew a temporary
contract than face the cost of ﬁring a worker on a permanent contract
(see Arai & Skogman Thoursie (2001)). For this reason, older workers
might take a smaller risk than younger workers if they abuse the sickness
insurance system. If this is the case, the number of older male workers
who report sick would be expected to increase to a larger extent than the
number of younger men during the sporting events. On the other hand,
the work ethic might be positively related to age, implying that the num-
ber of young male workers who report sick would increase more relative
to older men. To investigate potential behavioral diﬀerences among age
groups, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator is applied to various age
groups. In the analysis of the skiing competition, only two age groups,
those aged 20-44 and 45-64, were used. This is because not many workers
reported sick on a single Thursday. Regarding the Calgary Games, the
age groups 20-34, 35-54, 45-54 and 55-64 were used.9
9In Sweden, school children have a one-week winter break in February or March
depending on the child’s county of residence. Unfortunately, information on county
of residence is not available in the data and the break might coincide with the time
period of the sporting event. This is not a problem, however, unless workers report
sick to spend time with their children and such behavior diﬀers systematically between
men and women. Parents with children of school age are on average in the age group
30-55. If men report sick to spend the break with their children, the estimated eﬀect
of the sporting event would not be present for the youngest and the oldest age groups.
104R e s u l t s
The results from the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation of the eﬀect of
the Oberstdorf Thursday on the sick rate are reported in Table 1. The
top panel compares the change in male sick rates for one-day cases of
illness between the Oberstdorf Thursday and the preceding Thursday
(ﬁrst row) with the corresponding change for women (second row). The
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate is given by the ﬁgure in the third row
and the last column. The lower panel contains the corresponding ﬁgures
for two-day sick rates.
Regarding one-day sick rates, the results show an increase in the male
sick rate on the Oberstdorf Thursday by 0.58 percentage points. Women,
on the other hand, exhibit a decrease in their sick rate between the cor-
responding periods by 0.39 percentage points. Thus, the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence estimate of the Oberstdorf eﬀect yields a signiﬁcant increase
in the male sick rate by 0.97 percentage points. There were 1,272 men
who reported sick the previous Thursday, implying that the increase in
the number of men who reported sick associated with the skiing compe-
tition is estimated at approximately 16 percent (207/1,272).10 If women
reported sick in order to watch the skiing competition on television, the
male increase is underestimated (this holds for all estimated eﬀects ob-
tained in this paper).
– Table 1 about here –
Regarding two-day cases of illness the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate
of the Oberstdorf Thursday is not signiﬁcant. Apparently, workers in
general are not afraid to report sick for just one day in order to watch
the skiing competition and do not stay home a second day to convince
10The point estimate for the increased number of cases of illness for men is calculated
as (0.000097)×2,130,500.
11their employer that they are really sick.11 I also estimated the eﬀect
of two-day cases which started on Wednesday, but the hypothesis that
m e nr e p o r ts i c ko nW e d n e s d a yt oc o n v i n c et h e i re m p l o y e rt h a tt h e ya r e
indeed ill is not supported by the results.
If the model used to estimate the eﬀect of the Oberstdorf event
on reporting sick is correctly speciﬁed, there should be no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of any Thursday without any popular
sporting event. Thus, the key identifying assumption of the estimated
model–equation (1)–is that in the absence of the skiing competition, δ
would be zero. Using each of the four Thursdays before and after Ober-
stdorf as a potential ”sports Thursday”, with each Thursday in turn as
the comparison period, no signiﬁcant eﬀect should prevail. This yields 72
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates (see Table A2 in the Appendix). About
86 percent (62/72) of these estimates support the key identifying as-
sumption of the model. Most diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates show sig-
niﬁcant coeﬃcients with expected signs when the Oberstdorf Thursday
is included and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for those Thursdays when the
Oberstdorf Thursday is not included.
These results clearly indicate an eﬀect of the skiing competition in
terms of an increase in the number of men who report sick. Even though
this estimated eﬀect seems to be quantitatively small, it should be em-
phasized that the sporting event took place on a single day. From this
perspective, abuse of the sickness insurance system might be a substan-
tial problem if such behavior is present on several occasions during a
year.
The results from diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation of the eﬀect of the
winter Olympic Games in Calgary on the sick rate are presented in Table
2. For one-day cases, the male sick rate remains constant between the
11The eﬀect of the skiing competition was also estimated by the grouped probit
model. The results obtained above are conﬁrmed by such an analysis; results are
available on request.
12Calgary period and the preceding period. Women, on the other hand,
exhibit a substantial decrease in their sick rate between the correspond-
ing periods by 11.2 percentage points. If women constitute a suitable
comparison group, the number of men who reported sick should have
decreased to same extent as women. Thus, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimate of the Calgary eﬀect yields a signiﬁcant increase in the male
sick rate by 11.2 percentage points. There were 29,726 men who reported
sick during the pre-Calgary period, implying that the increase in one-day
cases associated with the Calgary Games is estimated at approximately
8 percent (2,434/29,726).12
In the Calgary analysis, a worker was permitted to report sick for
one day within the whole Calgary period instead of only one day as was
the case for Oberstdorf. For this reason, the quantitative increase in the
number of one-day cases associated with the Calgary games is substantial.
– Table 2 about here –
A ss h o w ni nT a b l e2 ,t h ec h a n g ei nt h en u m b e ro fm e nw h or e p o r t e d
sick during the Calgary Games for two days and up to seven days, there
are signiﬁcant eﬀects for all lengths in the interval between 2.9a n d1 6 .1
percentage points.13
The key identifying assumption of the model used to estimate the ef-
fects of the Calgary Games is that there should be no signiﬁcant diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence estimate of a two-week period when no Olympic Games took
place. Two two-week periods before as well as two two-week periods after
the Calgary Games were used in order to estimate a potential Calgary
eﬀect (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Of the 21 diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimates reported, 15 support the identifying assumption of the model.
12The point estimate for the increased number of cases of illness is calculated as
(0.00112)×2,173,200, where 2,173,200 is total male employment in the ﬁrst quarter
of 1988.
13Results when when estimating the grouped probit model conﬁrm the results ob-
tained above (available on request).
13As a ﬁnal analysis, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator was applied
to diﬀerent age groups (see Table 3). As the intention here is not to quan-
tify the results, the casual eﬀects were estimated by the grouped probit
model. The results clearly show that the causal eﬀect of the Oberstdorf
event is only signiﬁcant for younger workers aged 20-44. As regards the
Calgary Games, men in age groups 20-34 and 35-44 signiﬁcantly changed
their behavior with respect to reporting sick in order to watch the Cal-
gary Games but very few signiﬁcant eﬀects were estimated for the two
older age groups. If age is a good indicator of the degree of employment
protection, the results show that abuse of the sickness insurance system
is not related to employment protection. Instead, it might be the case
that the work ethic diﬀers across age groups.
– Table 3 about here –
To summarize, both sporting events implied a signiﬁcant increase in
the number of men who reported sick. The total increase in sick days
associated with the Calgary Games amounts to 43,744 (the quantiﬁed
eﬀects of both sports events are reported in Table A4 in the Appendix).
The average hourly wage rate for men in 1991 was approximately SEK
88.14 Based on an eight-hours workday, the daily wage of an average
male worker was therefore SEK 704.15 Multiplying this ﬁgure by 43,744,
the cost of the Calgary Games due to abuse of the sickness insurance
system amounts to more than SEK 30 million. This is about 3.6 percent
of the total costs for all one-day to seven-day cases of illness reported
during the two-week Calgary period. Some workers might have reported
sick for more than seven days in order to watch the Calgary Games. An
extended analysis might have found a signiﬁcant increase for eight-day
cases and longer.
14USD 1 is about SEK 10.
15The average hourly wage rate and the average daily working time for are from
the Swedish Level of Living Survey 1991.
145 Final remarks
This paper oﬀers an unusual way to measure the potential existence of
moral hazard. The diﬀerence in the number of men and women who
reported sick between the time period of a popular sporting event and
a preceding time period was analyzed in order to test the hypothesis
that men report sick so that they can watch the sporting event live,
i.e., during regular working time or at night. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimations provide clear evidence that younger male workers abused the
sickness insurance system.
The possibilities of watching sports on television have grown rapidly
in the last few decades. This might have reduced the propensity to abuse
the sickness insurance system in the sense that watching sports can now
be allocated to diﬀerent hours, including after work. On the other hand,
the greatest pleasure is most likely derived from watching the event live.
The results obtained in this paper show that moral hazard may po-
tentially give rise to a serious problem in the sickness insurance system.
If workers abuse the system to watching sports, such behavior might also
prevail for other reasons, such as hobbies. The two events considered
here were of very short duration. Aggregated over a year and consid-
ering various types of events which take place during regular working
time, the eﬀects might precipitate considerable losses in production and
productivity, as well as substantial costs to the sickness insurance system.
In further research, it would be interesting to study whether abuse of
the sickness insurance system is a decreasing function of ﬂexible working
hours–if workers could allocate time more freely between working and
leisure, the abuse might be less. Another issue concerns the extent to
which the sickness beneﬁtl e v e la ﬀects abusive behavior. One way to
obtain a casual eﬀect of the beneﬁt level on reporting sick would be
to use two identical sporting events–one taking place in a year with a
one-day waiting period and the other in a year with no waiting period.
15Unfortunately, I have not been able to ﬁnd such an event.
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18Tables
Table 1. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the eﬀect of the cross-
country skiing competition in Oberstdorf on the sick rate.
Thursday Thursday
February 5 February 12
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
1 sick day
Men 5.97*** 6.55*** 0.58**
(0.17) (0.18) (0.25)
Women 15.03*** 14.64*** -0.39
(0.27) (0.25) (0.36)
Men-women diﬀerence -9.06*** -8.09*** 0.97**
(0.32) (0.31) (0.45)
2 sick days
Men 10.64*** 10.81*** 0.17
(0.21) (0.22) (0.30)
Women 20.61*** 20.26*** -0.35
(0.33) (0.31) (0.47)
Men-women diﬀerence -9.97*** -9.45*** 0.53
(0.39) (0.39) (0.58)
NOTES:
i) Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (using 200 random samples with re-
placement).
ii) *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels.
iii) The sick rates are expressed as shares in percent of employment in hundreds. For
example, the male one-day sick rate on the Oberstdorf Thursday is 6.55, implying
that 0.0655 percent of employed men reported sick on this Thursday.
19Table 2. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the eﬀect of the Calgary Olympic
Games on the sick rate.
2-week period 2-week
before Calgary Calgary period
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
1 sick day
Men 136.8*** (0.8) 136.9*** (0.8) 0.1 (1.2)
Women 261.6*** (1.2) 250.5*** (1.1) -11.2*** (1.8)
Men-women diﬀerence -124.9*** (1.5) -113.6*** (1.4) 11.2*** (2.2)
2 sick days
Men 161.7*** (0.9) 166.6*** (0.9) 5.0*** (1.2)
Women 250.8*** (1.1) 239.6*** (1.1) -11.2*** (1.5)
Men-women diﬀerence -89.1*** (1.5) -73.0*** (1.3) 16.1*** (2.0)
3 sick days
Men 123.0*** (0.7) 124.1*** (0.8) 1.1 (1.1)
Women 160.8*** (0.8) 151.7*** (0.8) -9.2*** (1.2)
Men-women diﬀerence -37.9*** (1.0) -27.6*** (1.1) 10.3*** (1.4)
4 sick days
Men 82.8*** (0.6) 86.5*** (0.6) 3.7*** (1.0)
Women 99.5*** (0.7) 95.0*** (0.7) -4.6*** (1.0)
Men-women diﬀerence -16.7*** (0.9) -8.4*** (0.9) 8.3*** (1.3)
5 sick days
Men 97.0*** (0.6) 104.1*** (0.7) 7.2*** (0.9)
Women 103.3*** (0.7) 101.8*** (0.7) -1.6 (1.0)
Men-women diﬀerence -6.4*** (0.9) 2.4** (1.0) 8.7*** (1.4)
6 sick days
Men 49.1*** (0.5) 52.9*** (0.5) 3.8*** (0.7)
Women 49.5*** (0.5) 50.4*** (0.5) 1.0 (0.7)
Men-women diﬀerence -0.4 (0.6) 2.5*** (0.7) 2.9*** (1.0)
7 sick days
Men 101.7*** (0.7) 109.6*** (0.7) 7.9*** (1.03)
Women 99.5*** (0.7) 102.7*** (0.7) 3.2*** (1.0)
Men-women diﬀerence 2.2** (1.0) 6.9*** (0.9) 4.7*** (1.4)
NOTES: See Table 1.
20Table 3. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the two sporting events for diﬀerent
age groups using the grouped probit model.
Age group
Oberstdorf 20-44 45-64
1 sick day 0.08*** -0.01
(0.03) (0.04)




Calgary 20-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
1 sick day 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
2 sick days 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.04*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
3 sick days 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.03* 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
4 sick days 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
5 sick days 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
6 sick days 0.02*** 0.04** 0.04* -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
7 sick days 0.04*** 0.02 0.04** -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 301,020 238,120 173,080 120,200
NOTES:
i) Only the estimated coeﬃcients of the interaction variable between the time dummy
for the sporting event and the male dummy (i.e., the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate)
are reported.
ii) *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels.
iii) The number of observations for each age group is equal among all models using
diﬀerent numbers of sick days. This is because those under risk of reporting sick, i.e.,
the employed, are the same in each age group.
21Appendix
Table A1. Sample statistics for the population of cases of illness beginning on the
Oberstdorf Thursday and the pre-Oberstdorf Thursday in 1987, and the two-week




Age 37.5 (11.0) 37.9 (11.0)
Distribution of sick days
1 day 0.42 (3,344) 0.47 (6,832)
2 days 0.58 (4,701) 0.53 (7,833)
Empl. February 1987 2,130,500 1,957,500
Calgary games
Age 36.8 (11.4) 37.4 (11.6)
Distribution of sick days
1 day 0.18 (59,467) 0.25 (101,860)
2 days 0.21 (71,345) 0.24 (97,548)
3 days 0.16 (53,712) 0.16 (62,172)
4 days 0.11 (36,805) 0.10 (38,683)
5 days 0.13 (43,705) 0.10 (40,792)
6 days 0.07 (22,178) 0.05 (19,877)
7 days 0.14 (45,937) 0.10 (40,227)
Empl. 1st Quarter 1988 2,173,200 1,989,000
NOTES:
i) Standard deviations and the total number of cases of illness in parentheses.
ii) The employment ﬁgures are from Labor Force Surveys, Statistics Sweden (1987).
The female labor-force participation rate in the ﬁrst quarter of 1987 was 80.2 percent
(84.8 for men).
22Table A2. Grouped probit diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of Thursday eﬀects in
1987 using four pre-Oberstdorf and four post-Oberstdorf Thursdays.
-4 -3 -2 -1 Ob. +1 +2 +3 +4
-4 - -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.05** 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.01
- (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
-3 0.02 - 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.03) - (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
-2 0.01 -0.01 - 0.02 -0.04* 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) - (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
-1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 - -0.06*** -0.01 -0.04* -0.01 -0.00
0.03) (0.02) (0.02) - (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Ob. 0.05** 0.04 0.04* 0.06*** - 0.07*** 0.02 0.05** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) - (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
+1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07*** - -0.05* -0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) - (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
+2 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04* -0.02 0.05* - 0.03 0.04*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) - (0.03) (0.03)
+3 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.05** 0.02 -0.03 - 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) - (0.02)
+4 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.04* -0.01 -
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) -
NOTES:
i) Only coeﬃcient estimates representing the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates are re-
ported. Standard errors in parentheses.
ii) *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
iii) All estimations include the male dummy as well as a Thursday dummy variable.
iv) Ob. denotes the Oberstdorf Thursday, -1 the Thursday before Oberstdorf, +1 is
the Thursday after Oberstdorf, and so on.
v) The table should be read in the following way: the estimated coeﬃcient in column
1, row 2 is the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of the increase in males who reported
sick on the Thursday three weeks before and the Thursday four weeks before Oberst-
dorf.
23Table A3. Grouped probit diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the eﬀect of diﬀerent
two-week periods in 1988.
Calgary (-1) Calgary Calgary (+2)
Calgary (-2) Calgary (-1) Calgary (+1)
1 sick day 0.016** 0.035*** -0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
2 sick days -0.003 0.056*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
3 sick days -0.001 0.044*** -0.009
(0.0071) (0.007) (0.007)
4 sick days 0.001 0.051*** -0.024***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
5 sick days 0.006 0.049*** -0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
6 sick days 0.011 0.027*** -0.017*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
7 sick days 0.016** 0.025*** -0.014*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
NOTES:
i) Standard errors in parentheses.
ii) *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels.
iii) Column 1 shows the two-week pre-Calgary period as the investigation period, col-
umn 2 the Calgary eﬀects and column 3 the two-week period eﬀect using two periods
after Calgary as the investigation period.
24Table A4. Quantiﬁed eﬀects of the two sporting events based on the point estimates
from the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimations.
Males reported sick Event
period before eﬀects Percent Sick days
(1) (2) (2)/(1) (2)×length
W o r l dC h a m p i o n s h i pi n
Oberstdorf
1 sick day 1,272 207 16.2 207
2 sick days 2,266 113 5.0 226
Total 3,538 320 — 433
Calgary Olympic Games
1 sick day 29,726 2,434 8.2 2434
2 sick days 35,132 3,499 10.0 6998
3 sick days 26,732 2,238 8.4 6714
4 sick days 17,997 1,804 10.0 7216
5 sick days 21,074 1,891 9.0 9455
6 sick days 10,671 630 5.9 3780
7 sick days 22,108 1,021 4.6 7147
Total 163,440 13,517 — 43,744
25